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1. Introduction
Comprehending irony is a matter of oppositions: between speaker meaning 
and sentence meaning, and between speaker attitude and the attitude conveyed by 
the literal meaning of the sentence. As Table 1 shows, the context against which 
a sentence is uttered triggers its literal or ironic interpretation.
Table 1: A brief summary of literal/ironic criticisms/compliments
CONTEXT REMARK INTERPRETATION ATTITUDE
What an ugly 
house!
Literal Criticism
What a beautiful 
house!
Ironic Criticism
What a beautiful 
house!
Literal Compliment
What an ugly 
house!
Ironic Compliment
The complexity of irony comprehension is reflected on its relatively late 
acquisition. Research with hearing children showed that the comprehension of 
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ironic remarks begins only around the age of 6 (Ackerman 1983), and that ironic 
criticisms are comprehended earlier and better than ironic compliments (Harris & 
Pexman, 2003; Panzeri & Giustolisi, under review).  
As for the factors that might predict the development of irony comprehension, 
some authors claimed that Theory of Mind (ToM) abilities, and specifically the 
understanding of second order ignorance (Sullivan, Winner & Hopfield, 1995), 
are required to understand irony. Once the addressee recognizes that what the 
speaker said is literally false (e.g., “What a beautiful house” when the house is in 
fact ugly), he must recognize that the speaker believes that the hearer knows that 
the house is in fact ugly (second order ignorance) in order to interpret speaker’s 
statement as a joke or as a lie. However, ToM development is tightly linked to 
language abilities (Happè, 1995, Astington & Jenkins, 1999), and those studies 
which controlled for children’s linguistic competence found that it is linked with 
irony comprehension, together with, or even beyond, ToM level (Filippova & 
Astington, 2008, Bosco & Gabbatore, 2017).  
The asymmetry in the recognition of ironic criticisms and ironic 
compliments, on the other hand, might suggest the contribution of other factors in 
irony understanding. Ironic criticisms constitute the most common form of irony, 
and thus some scholars emphasized the role of conversational experiences in the 
development of irony understanding (Dews & Winner, 1997). It was our aim to 
contribute to this debate, focusing on irony comprehension in a group of deaf 
signing children. 
Studying the acquisition of verbal irony in deaf signers1 is interesting for 
several reasons. Firstly, deaf signers seem to present peculiar patterns in ToM 
development. In first order ToM tasks, native signers (i.e., those children who are 
born from deaf parents, and are exposed to sign language from birth) perform as 
hearing peers and they outperform late signers (those children who are born from 
hearing parents, and later acquire sign language) (a.o. Peterson, Wellman & Liu, 
2005). As for second order ToM, on the other hand, both native and non-native 
signers tend to perform worse than hearing peers do, even if native signers later 
catch up (O’Reilly, Peterson & Wellman, 2014). Moreover, the conversational 
experience of deaf signers is different from those of the hearing population, and 
this is also true for native signers. We only have to think at the different 
possibilities of interaction with peers, for example. 
Furthermore, only a few studies investigated the recognition of sarcasm 
(ironic criticism) in deaf signers, and as far as we know, to date no study has 
investigated the comprehension of ironic compliments. Peterson, Wellman and 
Slaughter (2012) tested late signers in Wellman & Liu (2004) 5-step ToM scale, 
to which a single item with sarcasm was added. They found that deaf children 
were delayed in all the items with respect to typically developing children, even 
                                                          
1 An ongoing investigation by our research group suggests that irony in Italian Sign 
Language is expressed through an inventory of manual and non-manual cues that can be 
used in domains different from irony, but in ironic remarks they combine simultaneously 
to convey the non-literal interpretation (Mantovan, Giustolisi and Panzeri, in preparation). 
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controlling for age and language abilities. O’Reilly and collaborators (2014) 
found that during childhood deaf native and non-native signers were impaired in 
sarcasm understanding. However, native signers performed as hearing controls in 
adulthood, whereas this was not true for non-native signers.  
Considering the presence of irony in everyday communication, and that the 
misinterpretation of ironic remarks might prevent the possibility of enjoying 
social relationships, we decided to analyze in depth irony comprehension in deaf 
signers using Italian Sign Language (LIS). Specifically, the goal of the present 
study was to investigate the development of the comprehension of ironic 
compliments and criticisms in deaf children and see whether they show a similar 
pattern as that reported by the literature on hearing children. Moreover, it was our 
purpose to investigate whether there is a relation between irony comprehension 
and success in ToM tasks in deaf signers. 
 
2. Methods 
 2.1. Participants 
 
Ten LIS signers participated (three females and seven males. Age: mean = 
9years(y), 2months(m); SD=1y,6m; range = 7y,5m – 11y,7m). They were all born 
in deaf families, and have been using LIS since birth. IQ was assessed using the 
Italian standardization of the Raven’s Colored Progressive Matrices (Belacchi, 
Scalisi, Cannoni, and Cornoldi, 2008). Biographical information of the 
participants is reported in Table 2. 
Informed consent was obtained from the parents of all children. The 
University of Milano-Bicocca Ethical Committee approved the study. 
Table 2: Biographical characteristics of the participants 
ID SEX AGE  (y,m) RAVEN (z-scores) 
S1 M 7,5 1.97 
S2 M 7,11 0.68 
S3 M 8,1 1.33 
S4 F 8,3 0.41 
S5 M 8,6 -1.62 
S6 M 8,6 0.22 
S7 M 9,4 -0,16 
S8 M 10,8 0.62 
S9 F 11,3 1.01 
S10 F 11,7* 1.01 
*Normative data are until age 11,6: 
To calculate S10 Raven z-score, we used mean  
and SD of the age-group 11,1-11,6  
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2.2. Materials 
 
ToM and irony comprehension tasks were administered in LIS. All responses 
were annotated online, but all testing sessions were video recorded to allow offline 
check. 
ToM tasks – We administered two ToM tasks assessing first and second order 
ToM. Only participants who responded correctly to the first order ToM task could 
perform the second order ToM task. 
As first order ToM task (I ToM, realizing that a person has a wrong belief) 
we used the Smarties task (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987; Gopnik & 
Astington 1988), and as second order ToM task a modified version of the Birthday 
puppy task (Sullivan, Zaitchik & Tager-Flusberg, 1994), using the drawings of 
the Enrique’s birthday task (Hutchins & Prelock, 2014). The task comprised a 
second order ignorance question (II Ig, – realizing that person X ignores what 
person Y knows) and a second order false belief question (II Bel, realizing that 
person X wrongly believes that person Y has a false belief). Children could thus 
obtain a maximum score of 3 points, provided they answered correctly also to the 
control questions. 
Irony comprehension task – This task was a translation in LIS of the task used 
in Panzeri & Giustolisi (under review). The example of one experimental item is 
reported in Appendix. 
The task consisted of ten stories, signed by a deaf native signer and video-
recorded, concluding with a remark that needed either literal interpretation ( Lit: 
four remarks: two criticisms and two compliments) or ironic interpretation (six 
remarks: three criticisms –Iro Cri– and three compliments –Iro Com–). After 
watching each story, children were asked two questions investigating irony 
understanding (understanding of signer’s meaning and recognition of signer’s 
attitude) and a control question about the context. Accuracy on the irony task was 
calculated considering the signer’s meaning and signer’s attitude questions. 
Importantly, five deaf adult native signers performed the irony task and they 
were at ceiling in both literal and ironic stories. 
 
3. Results 
 
Results are reported in Table 3. 
ToM tasks – Eight out of ten participants responded correctly to the Smarties 
task. Among them, seven participants responded correctly to the II order ToM 
ignorance question. Only two participants responded correctly to the II order ToM 
false belief question. 
Irony comprehension task – Overall, accuracy on literal remarks was 98%, 
on ironic remarks 59%. As expected, children could perform the task when the 
final remark triggered a literal interpretation. On the contrary, the performance on 
ironic remarks was extremely variable. 
Considering ironic remarks, mean accuracy was 47% (SD=50) on ironic 
compliments and 57% (SD=49) on ironic criticisms.  
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Accuracy on ironic remarks was analyzed using mixed logit models with 
random intercepts for each subject. As predictors, we entered age and attitude 
(criticism vs. compliment). None of the two factors reached significance (age: 
β=.03, SE=.02, z=1.401, p=.16; attitude: β=.48, SE=.40, z=1.20, p=.23). Thus, 
even if overall ironic criticisms were easier than ironic compliments, this 
difference did not reach significance, and moreover a closer inspection to the 
individual data reported in Table 3 reveals that this facilitation for ironic criticisms 
was not consistent across all participants (see e.g. S3). 
 
Table 3: By-subject results in the ToM and the Irony tasks 
ID I ToM II Ig II Bel Lit Iro Cri Iro Com 
S1 1 1 0 100 50 (55) 33(52) 
S2 1 1 0 100 83(41) 0 
S3 1 1 1 100 67(52) 100 
S4 1 1 0 100 50(55) 33(52) 
S5 0 NA NA 87 (35) 17(41) 100 
S6 1 1 0 100 17(41) 33(52) 
S7 1 1 0 100 33(52) 0 
S8 1 1 1 100 50(54) 67(52) 
S9 0 NA NA 100 100 0 
S10 1 0 0 100 100 100 
ToM tasks: 1=correct, 0=incorrect. Irony task: percentage of accuracy 
(SD). 
 
Irony comprehension and ToM – Considering the by-subject results reported
in Table 3 and the aggregate results shown in Table 4, in our small group of
deaf children, we could not find any clear relationship between the ToM tasks
and the Irony task. 
 
Table 4: Percentage of accuracy in the Irony task in relation to the ToM 
tasks 
ToM N Iro Cri Iro Com 
No ToM 2 58 (51) 50 (52) 
I order ToM 8 56 (50) 46 (50) 
II order ignorance 7 50 (51) 38 (49) 
II order false belief 2 58 (51) 83 (39) 
No ToM=wrong response in the smarties task; I order ToM=correct response 
in the smarties task; II order ignorance= correct response to the II order 
ignorance question; II order false belief= correct response to the II order false 
belief question; N=number of participants. Iro Cri/Com: percentage of 
accuracy (SD). 
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4. Discussion 
 
In this study, we tested first and second order ToM and comprehension of 
ironic criticisms and compliments in ten young deaf native signers. 
All but two participants passed the first order ToM task, whereas only two 
participants passed the second order false belief task. We were expecting all deaf 
participants to pass the first order ToM task, because they were all native signers. 
However, we acknowledge as a limit the fact that we had only one first order ToM 
question and participants might have failed only because they were distracted or 
tired. Since our group of deaf participants had a mean age of more than 9 years, 
the present results indicate a delay in second order ToM development with respect 
to hearing children, who reach second order ToM level around 6-7 years of age 
(see Panzeri & Giustolisi, under review). These results were expected considering 
previous research indicating a delay in second order ToM development in deaf 
signers (O’Reilly et al., 2014). As Table 4 shows, accuracy was higher for II order 
ignorance question than for II order false belief, in line with what Sullivan and 
colleagues (1995) found for hearing children. The irony comprehension task 
revealed that, contrary to literal language understanding, irony comprehension 
was a difficult task for the vast majority of our participants. However, some 
participants’ performance was good and, importantly, we controlled our task with 
five adult deaf native signers and their performance was at ceiling for both ironic 
criticisms and ironic compliments. Overall accuracy was higher for ironic 
criticisms than for ironic compliments, in line with spoken language literature 
(e.g. Harris & Pexman, 2003; Panzeri & Giustolisi, under review). However, the 
difference was not significant. Moreover, as Table 3 shows, five out of ten 
participants had a higher score on ironic criticisms than on ironic compliments, 
but for four out of ten participants the situation was the opposite. Why was it so 
and what determined a better result either in criticisms or in compliments is a 
question that needs further investigation and an increased sample size. 
Nevertheless, our results are in line with those of O’Reilly et al. (2014) showing 
that deaf native signers are at risk of delays in ironic criticisms comprehension 
during childhood. Our investigation extends this observation to ironic 
compliments. 
As for the relationship between ToM and irony, our small sample of deaf 
children suggests that ToM abilities per se do not constitute a good predictor of 
irony. Considering the two participants failing the first order ToM task, one (S9) 
responded perfectly to ironic criticisms questions, systematically failing ironic 
compliments questions, whereas the other (S5) had almost a mirror performance. 
Moreover, success in the second order ignorance question did not ensure good 
performance at the irony task, in opposition to what suggested by Sullivan et al. 
(1995). To this point, it is important to notice that O’Reilly et al. (2014) found 
that the link between second order ToM success (false belief understanding, in 
that case) and sarcasm understanding was different between deaf native signers 
and hearing peers. 
Coming back to our research question, i.e. the development of irony 
comprehension on deaf native signers and the relationship with ToM 
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development, we can conclude that our deaf participants lag behind hearing peers 
in both irony and second order ToM understanding. However, ToM abilities do 
not appear to directly sustain irony comprehension. We think that two different 
explanations could be provided. 
First, we can hypothesize that the task that has been used to assess deaf 
children mastery of second order ToM might not tap the actual 
metarepresentational abilities of these children. Sullivan and colleagues (1995) 
found that a simplification of the syntactic structure of the II order false belief 
question improved children’s performance. Instead of a question with double 
embedding (“What does X think that Y thinks that Y will get for Y’s birthday?”), 
a third character Z was introduced, who posed a simpler question to X (“What 
does Y think that Y will get for Y’s birthday?), and the child has to answer 
assuming X’s view point. The introduction of a third character might in fact add 
conceptual complexity due to a more advanced grammatical use of the signing 
space. In sign languages, abstract spatial locations are used to establish anchors, 
which are then associated to the discourse referents (Barberà & Zwets, 2013). This 
anchoring strategy allows the signer to anaphorically refer back to already 
established referents in the discourse. In our task, the II order false belief question 
required deaf children to control the simultaneous anchoring of three animated 
referents (rather than two as in the II order ignorance question) and this might 
have represented a further complication. 
A second type of explanation, put forth in Panzeri and Giustolisi (under 
review) for typically developing hearing children, assumes an opposite view on 
the relationship between second order ToM and irony comprehension. Different 
studies found a correlation between second order ToM and irony, and assumed 
that ToM is a prerequisite for irony comprehension. The direction of the 
implication could in fact be reversed. Understanding irony (that is, being able to 
infer that a speaker uttered a blatantly false statement with the intent of conveying 
the opposite meaning, because she knows that her addressee knows that the 
remark is false) might trigger, or at least reinforce, the ability to attribute second 
order beliefs that is tapped by ToM tasks. According to this hypothesis, then, it is 
the delay in irony understanding that would slower the development of higher 
order ToM abilities.  
The difficulties in comprehending non-literal language could be attributed 
also to deaf children scarce exposure to irony in everyday life. As already alluded 
to, even native signers have less possibilities of interaction with peers.  Moreover, 
reduced access to TV due to scarce subtitle services and reduced reading 
experience due to the difficulties that deaf children experience in reading 
development might result in a reduced exposition to all instances of irony, which 
could lead to the observed developmental delay and the peculiar pattern of results 
here reported.  
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Appendix  
 
Example of ironic criticism – English translation from LIS 
 
Background: Tommy is spending the afternoon playing at Paul’s home. 
Tommy asks Paul to pick up the Legos to build a big spaceship. At first, Paul does 
not want to play with Legos because he is worried that after playing his room 
would be a mess. Tommy promises that he will help Paul to tidy up the room. 
However, when it is time for Tommy to go home, he leaves without helping Paul. 
The room remains a mess. So Paul tells Tommy… 
 
Remark: “Thank you for helping me tidying up!” 
 
Questions: Paul told Tommy: Thank you for helping me tidying up! 
 
A. What did Paul mean? Paul meant that: Tommy helped him/Tommy did 
not help him? 
B. How was Paul’s room when Tommy left? 
C. Why did Paul thank Tommy for his help? When Paul thank Tommy for 
his help in tidying up, Paul wanted to compliment or criticize Tommy? 
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